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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this article is to explore the role of instruments in the transformation of institutional logics 
and their associated practices at the micro level. Based on an ethnographic study, this article compares two 
working groups — one responsible for equity and the other for fixed-income investments — in an asset 
management company attempting to integrate new demands for socially responsible investment (SRI). 
These two working groups both sought to change their investment processes through the introduction of 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2434177 
 
2 
 
new calculative devices. The equity group was perceived to be more successful than the fixed-income 
group in introducing SRI because of its greater ability to fabricate calculative devices capable of mediating 
between financial returns and social responsibility. Elaborating on these findings, the article argues that 
instruments can effect institutional change when actors come to believe that available instruments are 
sufficiently flexible and incomplete to act as “mediating instruments” between practice and institutional 
change. 
 
Key words: Equity Investment – Fixed-Income Investment – Institutional Logics – Mediating 
Instruments – Socially Responsible Investment  
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Introduction 
 
Instruments of accounting matter. Accountants have long been interested in the “interplay between 
ways of calculating and ways of managing social and organizational life” (Hopwood & Miller, 1994, p. 1). 
The concepts of institutional logics, practices, and instruments are all widely used in accounting. Yet there 
has been little research on the mechanisms by which, and the conditions under which, instruments can 
mediate the transformation of institutional logics and their associated practices, especially at the micro 
level (Cloutier & Langley, 2013; Ezzamel, Robson, & Stapleton, 2012; Jones, Boxenbaum, & Anthony, 
2013). This is surprising, especially since accountants are acutely aware of the mediating role of 
instruments, such as auditing standards and technology roadmaps, in framing practices in their 
institutional environment (e.g., Mennicken, 2008; Miller & O’Leary, 2007). Scholarship on institutional 
logics has centered on practice variation as a basis of transformation (Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 2012; 
Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). However, researchers have almost entirely neglected the role of 
instruments as a vehicle to enable these practice variations. Part of the problem is that they have not 
engaged with developments in accounting theory that have pointed to the role of accounts and accounting 
instruments in creating the classificatory and evaluative media through which practice changes are 
effected. 
 
This article addresses the role played by instruments such as financial models and financial criteria — 
so-called calculative devices (Callon & Muniesa, 2005) — in the transformation of the logic and practices 
of the asset management industry, following the emergence of new demands for socially responsible 
investment (SRI). For an industry, a logic consists of the “identities and valuation orders that structure the 
decision making and the practices of the players in a product market” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 805). 
Examining these mechanisms is central to understanding how institutional change is facilitated or 
hindered in an environment where calculative devices are so fundamental (MacKenzie, 2011). It is also 
necessary in order to understand the decisive role played by accounting in institutional change. Miller and 
Power (2013, p. 592) have argued that accounting is a “variable bearer of potential institutional logics 
providing the mechanism for their realization and expression at the organizational level.” 
 
 The term socially responsible investment refers to the incorporation of non-financial criteria, such as 
carbon emissions or human rights indicators, into investment processes, with the aim of generating better 
financial performance and restoring a long-term perspective to asset management. SRI involves a 
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transformation of the financial logic that underlies the practices of asset management. Based on a three-
year ethnographic study, using participative observation, semi-structured interviews, and documentary 
evidence, this article compares how two working groups in an asset management company redesigned 
their equity and fixed-income investment processes by transforming their calculative devices to integrate 
SRI demands. A central concern is the question of the role of these devices in explaining why SRI was 
apparently better integrated in the equity investment processes than in the fixed-income versions. To date, 
little research has explicitly examined whether and why demands for SRI shape the practices used for 
different types of products within the industry in different ways. 
 
 This article explores the role of instruments in the transformation of the institutional logic of the 
asset management industry and its associated practices at the micro level. It specifically seeks to identify 
the mechanisms through which a change in institutional logic is instituted, and how the logic, practices, and 
instruments mobilized by actors within an organization are bound together in a recursive relationship. The 
article also analyzes how institutional and practice change are effected through the transformation of 
instruments that mediate the relationships between the logic and its associated practices (Kurunmäki & 
Miller, 2011; Miller & O’Leary, 2007; Miller & Power, 2013). 
 
 The second aim of the current research is to establish the conditions that make the co-transformation 
of the logic, practices, and instruments possible. The article shows that actors’ perceptions of a lack of 
appropriate instruments may impede institutional change by preventing the available instruments from 
serving as mediating instruments, which are instruments that mediate between arenas and actors (Miller & 
O’Leary, 2007, p. 702). This article argues that actors’ beliefs in the flexibility and incompleteness of the 
instruments in use help explain institutional and practice change by facilitating collective work and the 
generation of new knowledge that together enrich previous practices. Within the same industry, different 
categories of products are therefore amenable to institutional change to differing extents owing to the 
specificity of instruments in use and their associated “clusters of evaluation practices” (MacKenzie, 2011, 
p. 1783). 
 
The next section describes the theoretical context, and is followed by sections detailing the research 
setting and methods. The study moves on to present the empirical segment that summarizes 
developments in the two working groups as they responded to pressures to incorporate SRI. The 
following section then analyzes those different developments. The study concludes by reflecting upon the 
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implications of the findings for theorizing the role of instruments in the transformation of logics and 
practices. 
 
Theoretical background 
 
The role of instruments in mediating practice and institutional change 
 
Accounting scholars have long referenced both practice and institutional theories to study accounting 
change. Two decades ago, Hopwood and Miller considered accounting to be a “social and institutional 
practice.” (1994). Since then, several researchers have attempted to conceptualize the role of accounting in 
mediating the relationships between practice and institutional change (e.g., Abernethy & Chua, 1996; 
Burns & Scapens, 2000; Dambrin, Lambert, & Sponem, 2007; Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004; 
Hopper & Major, 2007). 
 
Previous research has demonstrated that accounting, institutional, and practice change are mutually 
connected through two relationships. First, accounting instruments and practices are influenced by both 
institutional and other practice elements. Abernethy and Chua (1996), for instance, argued that both the 
institutional environment and the strategic choices of actors influence the design of organizations’ control 
packages. In a similar vein, Guerreiro, Rodrigues and Craig (2012) demonstrated that institutional 
pressures influenced decisions to voluntarily adopt International Financial Reporting Standards. Lander, 
Koene and Linssen (2013) explored the strategic responses adopted by mid-tier accounting firms when 
faced with conflicting trustee and commercial logics. They revealed a process of “blending 
experimentation” in which actors combined different elements of multiple logics. 
 
 Second, researchers have found that when accounting practices and instruments are transformed, 
other organizational practices, and indeed even the whole field and its associated logics, are often 
transformed too. Oakes, Townley and Cooper (1998) studied how the mechanisms of control involved in 
business planning processes transformed the identity of producers by changing the capital of a field. 
Ahrens and Chapman (2007) showed how management control systems both shaped and were shaped by 
shared norms and understandings, which institutional theorists would refer to as logics. Lastly, Ezzamel et 
al. (2012) studied the sources of practice variation in institutional change by exploring the introduction of 
new accounting practices. They notably argued that budgeting technologies contributed to institutional 
change by providing new tools for cognition, stating “budgeting was not a neutral technology of 
representation within the field: budgeting both represents and intervenes” (Ezzamel et al., 2012, p. 19). 
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The above studies show that accounting scholars have demonstrated the essential mediating function 
of instruments — such as accounting standards and financial criteria — in the transformation of practices 
in relation to their institutional environments. In their historical overview of the discipline, Miller and 
Power (2013) identified this mediating role as being one of the four key functions of accounting. 
Summarizing these relationships, Miller and O’Leary (2007) coined the concept of “mediating 
instruments” that “operate as both means of representation and means of intervention, connecting with, 
yet remaining distinct from the object of intervention” (Kurunmäki & Miller, 2011, p. 222). Miller and 
O’Leary (2007) showed how Moore’s law and technology roadmaps acted as mediating instruments by 
helping to link a multitude of actors and domains to protect future markets in the microprocessor 
industry. This relationship has also been studied in other fields, such as auditing (Mennicken, 2008) and 
education (Ezzamel et al., 2012). 
 
Scholars of the sociology of science and social studies of finance have sought to explain this mediating 
role of instruments by asserting that instruments have performative functions (e.g., Callon, 1998; Vollmer, 
Mennicken, & Preda, 2009). The concept of performativity explains how instruments have the capacity 
“to transform transaction forms, rules and objects” (Vollmer et al., 2009) or to prevent change by 
reinforcing existing logics. Central to this role are the “interrelated issues of calculation, calculative agency 
and the conditions under which the latter arise” (Miller & O’Leary, 2007, p. 710). According to Callon 
(1998), calculation and agency are two sides of the same coin, and calculativeness could not exist without 
calculative devices. Calculative devices include analytical tools and techniques such as equations, financial 
models, and criteria that help actors engage in decision making (Callon & Muniesa, 2005; Preda, 2009). 
 
Specifically, MacKenzie (2011) showed that the “clusters of evaluation practices” associated with 
calculative devices (a concept loosely analogous to Knorr-Cetina’s “epistemic cultures” (Knorr-Cetina, 
1999, p. 1783)) sustain distinctive ontologies (distinctive presuppositions about the nature and properties 
of the features and processes of the economic world) even when the types of products are very similar, 
such as ABSs and CDOs1. He suggested that clusters of evaluation practices are path-dependent and that 
the interactions between them and the ways in which they become organizational routines contribute to 
explaining major institutional events, such as the 2008 financial crisis. In doing so, MacKenzie reminded 
us that the relationships between actors and their instruments are expected to be at least as important as 
the relationships within and between organizations and their institutional environments. However, few 
                                                          
1 ABSs (asset-backed securities, most importantly mortgage-backed securities) and CDOs (collateralized debt 
obligations). 
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studies have explored the mechanisms through which instruments can play a mediating role in institutional 
transformation, and the conditions under which the mediating role of instruments is possible, especially at 
the micro level. According to Jones et al. (2013, p. 69), we need to better theorize the role of instruments 
in the transformation of logics in order to understand how different logics and practices become anchored 
in organizations. 
 
Theorizing the relationships between logics, practices and instruments: the challenge of disentanglement 
 
A number of scholars have pointed to the centrality of practice change as a basis of institutional 
transformation (e.g., Jones et al., 2013; Lounsbury, 2008; Smets et al., 2012; Thornton et al., 2012; Weick, 
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). Smets et al. (2012) developed an important model of practice-driven 
institutional change, providing key insights into how institutional change can emerge from the routine 
activities of individuals. Although the authors acknowledged the material dimension of practices (p.879), 
their model included no material element and did not delve into the role of instruments. 
 
One explanation for this lack of theorization is the inherent difficulty of disentangling the 
relationships between logics, instruments, and practices. Jarzabkowski (2008, p. 623) explained that logics 
“are instantiated and adapted in the daily lives of individuals”. Powell and Colyvas (2008, p. 276) similarly 
argued that “institutional logics are instantiated in and carried by individuals through their actions, tools 
and technologies.” Yet, it is essential to avoid conflating practices, logics, and instruments. Indeed, while 
logics are instantiated at the practice level, it is most important to remember that logics refer to guiding 
principles underlying the practices of a field (Thornton et al., 2012) while practices relate to the actual 
patterns of activities enacted by actors in their work (Schatzki, 2001, p. 2). While no institutional change 
can occur at the field level without a change in the enactment of logics at the practice level, this does not 
mean that logics and practices are interchangeable constructs. Instruments enable the evaluation and 
valuation of practices (the latter term referring to the attribution of value). They both classify and signify 
the world (Kjellberg & Mallard, 2013). Just as there is an indeterminate relationship between a logic and a 
set of practices, such that practices both enact and produce logics, so instruments are both vehicles by 
which practices are represented and produced, both a “means of representation and means of 
intervention” (Kurunmäki & Miller, 2011, p. 222). 
 
Our goal should be to understand how instruments are both deployed to represent an institutional 
logic, yet are also variably productive of the logic, the world of practice, and the objects through which 
that practice and logic are effected. Several researchers have attempted to theorize the relationships 
between logics, practices, and instruments. There are, however, few empirical examples of the calculative 
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practices of actors at work (Beunza & Stark, 2004; Kalthoff, 2005). For instance, Kaghan and Lounsbury 
reported how institutional logics shape how instruments “are constructed, used and understood” (Kaghan 
& Lounsbury, 2005, p. 260), but not how instruments could influence the understanding and 
transformation of logics. Friedland (2013) acknowledged this recursive relationship, but neither he 
accounted for the mechanisms through which it could occur, nor did he offer empirical analysis. Ezzamel 
et al. (2012) went further, exploring how new institutional logics were relayed by accounting technologies 
at the field level, which then triggered new organizational practices. However, the study does not explain 
“the way that budgeting, as a technology of  ‘representation’, has created the conditions through which 
these tensions have been played” (Ezzamel et al., 2012, p. 19). As Miller and O’Leary (2007, p. 701) 
explained: 
 
The term “institution” is a convenient shorthand for designating the ways in which 
the beliefs of actors in persistent technological change become routine and taken for 
granted (MacKenzie, 1996, p. 58). But we need a fuller understanding of how this 
process of “embedding” is achieved, what practices or instruments help link the 
actions and expectations of actors across formally separate and diverse domains. 
 
This article aims to address this concern by, as Nicolini (2009) put it, “zooming in” on the 
transformation of an industry logic and its associated practices and instruments within an organization. 
Drawing on the concept of mediating instruments (Miller & O’Leary, 2007), this article explores how and 
why instruments — specifically calculative devices — both triggered and prevented the transformation of 
practices associated with two different types of products, equity and fixed-income funds, following 
demands for socially responsible investment. 
 
Research context 
 
Socially responsible investment is still evolving. For the purposes of this study, SRI is defined as the 
integration of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria into investment decisions in the belief 
that this will generate better long-term financial performance and contribute to propelling financial 
markets toward sustainability. In France, most asset managers adopt a best-in-class approach, which 
consists of selecting the most socially responsible and financially interesting companies, irrespective of 
their industry, so armaments manufacturers or alcohol producers can be included in an SRI portfolio, if 
they are among the most socially responsible firms in their segment. 
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During the period covered by the study, an increasing number of French asset management 
companies were facing growing client demands for SRI, who hoped to achieve better long-term financial 
performance and increase the legitimacy of their investors in the eyes of society (Arjaliès, 2010). At the 
end of 2009, an estimated 90% of assets under management by conventional funds included at least one 
ESG criterion, compared with 61% at the end of 2008 and 3% at the end of 2007 (Novethic, 2010). In 
contrast, purely SRI funds represented only 3% of total assets. 
 
Despite this growth, the positive relationship between SRI and financial performance had yet to be 
demonstrated, and asset managers were finding it difficult to achieve optimal financial and SRI 
performance simultaneously.2 Asset managers often perceived the new demands for SRI as contradictory 
to the financial logic of the industry. Strongly anchored in market capitalism, asset managers were said to 
be rational and fixated on maximizing wealth (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007), aiming to increase 
profits by optimizing risk and return and effectively being guided by economic theories, such as portfolio 
theory for equity investment and the yield curve for fixed-income investment (Laurel, 2013). The key 
features of the financial logic that dominated the asset management industry are summarized in Table 1. 
SRI imposed non-financial constraints on investment decisions, and was often judged to be detrimental to 
financial performance. In addition, no public organization, including the national stock market’s regulatory 
body, controlled the SRI content of SRI funds. Consequently, any asset management company could 
claim that its funds were socially responsible. The resulting multiple competing claims served only to 
increase the confusion among clients about what was and was not SRI (see Appendix A for information 
on the definition of an SRI fund). 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
                                                          
2 The 2007 UNEP-FI report “Demystifying Responsible Investment Performance” reviews the 20 most influential 
studies on the relationship between SRI and financial performance without reaching any firm conclusions. The AP7 
report, published in 2011, analyzed 21 academic studies published after UNEP-FI’s report and confirms the absence 
of any systematic relationship, whether positive, negative, or neutral.  
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Against this background, SRI Invest3, a small asset management subsidiary of one of the largest 
French mutual insurance companies, with EUR 2 billion under management, found itself in an awkward 
predicament in 2007. Despite specializing in SRI since 1997, its SRI funds were judged old-fashioned by 
the consultants paid by institutional investors to select the best asset management companies to be invited 
to tender for investment. Its integration of ESG criteria into investment processes was deemed too 
superficial and simplistic, and accordingly its fees for active management4 were considered unjustifiably 
high. Furthermore, SRI Invest found it difficult to demonstrate the added value of its funds over those of 
its competitors, both in terms of financial and SRI performance. The company therefore had little chance 
of receiving invitations to tender and its survival was under threat. 
 
A new CEO with more than 40 years’ experience in asset management was hired to redesign the 
company’s two main practices: equity and fixed-income investment processes (both incorporating SRI). 
An equity investment process is the buying, holding, and selling of shares on a stock market in 
anticipation of income in the form of dividends and gains on subsequent sales as the value of the stock 
rises. A fixed-income investment process, in contrast, consists of lending money to a borrower for a 
certain period of time in exchange for interest (also known as debt management).5 These differences will 
be further outlined below. 
 
To redesign the investment processes, the CEO launched two working groups, one for each type of 
investment. Each group was composed of representatives from the sales (two project managers), asset 
management (two asset managers and one financial analyst), and SRI departments (three SRI analysts); 
only the asset managers were different in the two groups. The goal of each working group was to redesign 
investment processes in order to meet the new demands for SRI while maintaining good financial 
performance. Figure 1 shows the organizational chart of SRI Invest. 
                                                          
3 SRI Invest is a pseudonym. 
4 Active management refers to a portfolio management strategy in which the manager aims to outperform his/her 
benchmark index.  
5 This article focuses on the managers of investment-grade fixed-income assets. A security is considered to be 
investment-grade if it has an S&P rating of BBB- or higher, a Moody’s rating of Baa3 or higher, a Fitch rating of 
BBB- or higher, or if it has the equivalent minimum rating from another nationally recognized credit rating agency. 
Fixed-income securities that are below investment-grade are often referred to as “junk bonds.” The fixed-income 
managers under study in the article invest in both corporate and sovereign bonds.  
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------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Research methods 
 
Research design 
 
Given the research objective of identifying and understanding practice “as it happens” (Schatzki, 
2005), an ethnographic approach seemed especially appropriate. As such, I embarked on a three-year 
project placement with SRI Invest. From May 2006 to May 2009, I worked as an SRI analyst and was 
allowed to use the data I collected for academic purposes. My involvement with this company took the 
form of a doctoral agreement between SRI Invest, my university, and myself, under the control of the 
French Ministry of Research.6 Given my dual status as a Ph.D. student and an SRI analyst, my role was 
twofold: to provide SRI analysis of the sectors I was responsible for, and to report on my research to both 
the company and my university. This study was part of a broader industry-wide research project examining 
whether and how the financial logic of the French asset management industry was changing following the 
growing demand for SRI. The broader industry-level study revealed that most asset management 
companies were in the same situation as SRI Invest, although SRI Invest began redesigning its funds later 
than its competitors. Throughout the research, three main types of data sources were used: participative 
observation, interviews, and documentary evidence. 
 
Data sources 
 
                                                          
6 Known as a CIFRE (Industrial Contracts for Training through Research).  
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Participative observation. I visited the company almost every day during two and a half years of my research 
contract (2006–2009) (six months were dedicated to the writing of my Ph.D.). As an SRI analyst, I 
analyzed two sectors — financial services and utilities — using the calculative devices of each type of 
investment on a daily basis. I attended all the meetings of both working groups and also gleaned 
information from informal situations like coffee and lunch breaks. I spoke regularly at the meetings, 
together with the other SRI analysts. For instance, I explained the potential effects of asset managers’ 
suggestions on the analysis of SRI in my own two sectors. Following a reflexive ethnographic approach 
(Whyte, 1943), I kept a detailed diary describing the main events of each day spent at SRI Invest. The final 
diary comprised hundreds of pages of notes. In order to gain insights at the industry level, I also took part 
in think tank events, working groups, SRI roadshows, conferences, and business meetings with 
consultants, agencies, and brokers, attending nearly 40 formal events per year. These formal meetings were 
complemented by many informal discussions with various industry actors. 
 
Semi-structured interviews. In May 2006, I conducted initial interviews with most company members to get a 
better understanding of the firm’s asset management operations. In February and March 2009, I 
conducted interviews lasting between one and two hours with all members of the two working groups and 
the Director of Support Functions. All 2009 interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. All actors 
were asked to explain their feelings, their understanding of the situation, how the redesign took place in 
practice, why they acted in a certain way, how they interpreted the reactions of other group members, and 
if they thought the redesign was right. At the end of each interview, they were asked if they considered the 
redesign successful and why, and which key events they remembered. To complement this insider 
perspective (Schotter, 2010), I conducted over 40 interviews across the industry from July 2007 to March 
2009. These included interviews with five asset management companies, four financial institutions, two 
brokers, two trade unions, four consultants, one trade association, two NGOs, one pension fund, one 
think tank, and five social rating agencies. The purpose of using a cross-level design (i.e., practice and field 
levels) (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 185) was to be sure that the financial logic studied at the working group 
level was a good reflection of the institutional logic in the field. 
 
Documents and secondary evidence. I collected and scrutinized large volumes of data, including minutes of 
meetings, e-mails, calculative devices, and presentations of processes to clients. My analysis also included 
documents and secondary sources at the industry level, including trade association surveys, professional 
reports (by consultants, asset managers, brokers, and social rating agencies), NGO studies, newspapers, 
newsletters, and websites. Further details are provided in Appendices B and C. 
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Data analysis 
 
The study followed an abductive process of going back and forth between the data, the literature, and 
the company (Dewey, 1938; Lorino, Tricard, & Clot, 2011; Lukka & Modell, 2010). For instance, 
conducting interviews at the industry level soon revealed that other firms were experiencing similar issues 
to SRI Invest. This revelation triggered my curiosity regarding the reasons for these problems and I 
regularly referred to them during meetings, in e-mails, and in informal discussions, systematically asking 
participants for their interpretations. 
 
In the course of the process, I developed an “emerging coding” system (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
Specifically codes emerged from the collected data, in this case “lack of ESG criteria,” “financial 
performance,” “client demands,” and so on. Each e-mail and document collected (between five and 20 e-
mails per day and five documents per week in all) was categorized accordingly. The same coding was used 
for the industry-level interviews, which helped me to refine my categories. For instance, I asked social 
rating agencies and brokers whether they encountered difficulties with fixed-income investment. I also 
discussed issues with SRI analysts in other asset management companies to ascertain whether they were 
having the same problems. Five months after the working groups were launched, I started to piece 
together the work done from my notes, e-mails, and documents to see how the different problems 
emerged. These results were triangulated with industry-level data to identify which problems were specific 
to SRI Invest and which were more broadly applicable to the industry as a whole. I also thoroughly 
examined the calculative devices (mainly Excel files and databases) available in the company to see 
whether the asset managers’ complaints about ESG criteria were justified. In order to validate these 
findings, ten months after the working groups were disbanded I interviewed all the people who had been 
members of both groups and convened a collective meeting to reflect on what had happened. Before the 
interviews and meeting, each interviewee read a draft of an earlier version of this paper provided as a 
discussion aid. I also discussed my research findings with other practitioners at the industry level. I 
maintained an informal dialogue with several key members of SRI Invest until we reached consensus on 
the findings and no alternative explanations were being suggested. This point was reached at the beginning 
of January 2010. My main concern throughout was to account for how and why the financial logic 
instantiated within the two types of products had (not) been transformed. 
 
 14 
 
While ethnographic research has been used before in social studies of finance (Vollmer et al., 2009), 
one potential concern is that the researcher may unconsciously guide the research process, introducing a 
bias toward the expected findings. This study attempted to overcome such bias by inviting continuous 
critical feedback from both practitioners and researchers and triangulating the different sources of data. 
Given the length of the research period and the wide-ranging array of interviews, observations, 
documents, and secondary data, I was able to obtain rich contextual detail. 
 
Case study 
 
Equity working group 
 
The first working group meeting relating to equity investment took place in September 2007 and was 
chaired by the Director of Sales and SRI. The investment process had not changed for ten years and 
consisted of three stages: first, SRI grades provided by two social rating agencies were used to draw up a 
ranking of companies based on their ESG performance; second, SRI analysts conducted further analysis 
on all the shortlisted companies; third, asset managers selected companies for the portfolios so as to 
ensure that the fund’s SRI grade (obtained by adding each company’s grade) was above average. 
 
The sales representatives were convinced that the consultants’ criticism of the firm’s SRI funds was 
solely due to miscommunication. As such, they asked the asset managers and SRI analysts to give a more 
detailed description of their work by providing written assessments for 300 companies. Each assessment 
included a one-page explanation of the SRI grades, which were based on hundreds of ESG and financial 
criteria together with the SRI analysts’ and asset managers’ own professional opinions. The analysts and 
asset managers were unhappy with this request, which would be extremely time-consuming to fulfill. They 
believed the problem lay not in miscommunication, but in the selection of companies. Working group 
discussions were heated: the Director of Sales and SRI interpreted the SRI analysts’ and asset managers’ 
reluctance as a refusal to work, and the analysts and asset managers felt the Director did not understand 
SRI. 
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Despite this disagreement, the working group tried, over a period of several weeks, to design 
PowerPoint presentations describing the various stages of the investment process. It also worked on the 
content of the one-page assessment. This brought up a number of questions regarding the process of 
selecting companies, such as which ESG criteria should be selected for each sector, and what balance 
should be struck between ESG and financial criteria. Two months after the launch of the working groups, 
three people from the three different departments (sales, SRI, and asset management) began to discuss 
these questions informally before deciding to seek a solution together and unofficially assume the 
leadership of the working group. They carefully studied what competitors were doing and compared this 
with the funds run by SRI Invest. The limitations of SRI Invest’s funds became clear: the asset manager 
lacked room to maneuver when selecting companies and the ESG criteria were too simplistic. Moreover, 
no company was excluded merely for SRI reasons, although “SRI selectivity,” the performance criterion 
that assessed the proportion of companies excluded for SRI reasons, was deemed very important by 
clients. The purpose of the working group now became twofold: to give the asset manager more freedom 
in company selection by loosening the SRI constraint, and to increase funds’ SRI selectivity. Since many 
companies deemed financially sound were considered “SRI laggards” and vice versa, the main challenge 
was to reach high SRI selectivity without endangering financial performance. 
 
At every meeting, each department put forward new ideas to the other two departments. In response 
to these ideas, the departments worked together on proposals that could meet the requirements of them 
all, and gradually, a new way of selecting companies was developed. Meanwhile, the working group looked 
at how other asset management companies were identifying investment opportunities. Between meetings, 
the sales department incorporated the new proposals into its PowerPoint presentations of the investment 
processes and submitted them to clients and consultants for feedback. 
 
Throughout this process, the SRI analysts and asset managers worked on new ESG criteria that they 
believed would influence financial performance. They reduced the weighting of ESG criteria they 
considered less important for the long-term survival of companies, such as donations to charity. They 
closely studied companies with contradictory financial and SRI profiles. They wanted to find out whether 
ESG criteria provided information that the market did not incorporate, or whether ESG criteria were 
meaningless in business terms. For this purpose, they developed a database of SRI grades and translated 
their own financial and SRI knowledge of companies into grades in order to test the relationship between 
SRI and financial performance with an econometric approach. This gave rise to a “decision matrix” 
method that compared the SRI and financial rankings of each company (see Figure 2). 
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------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
The existing SRI grade in the portfolio was replaced by the profile defined under this matrix in order 
to favor companies with the best combinations of SRI and financial profiles. Companies considered 
laggards in both finance and SRI terms would therefore be excluded from the portfolio. Depending on 
their position in the matrix, other companies would be over, equally, or underrepresented in portfolios 
compared to their benchmark indices (i.e., DJ Eurostoxx 300). Five months after the launch of the 
working group, a new investment process had been redesigned on paper (see Figure 3). As ESG criteria 
had been reframed in terms of financial performance requirements, this new process was deemed 
appropriate to meet both SRI and financial demands. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Nevertheless, SRI Invest needed clearance from the French financial authorities before it could 
implement the new investment process. It also needed to test the investment process on fictitious 
portfolios to determine the tracking error.7 Over a four-month period, the working group continued to 
meet weekly to discuss the results of these tests. Meanwhile, all staff behaved as though the new 
investment process was already in place. The SRI analysts and asset managers assessed companies using 
their new criteria and matrix. In May 2008, SRI Invest received clearance and the tests were declared 
successful. The asset manager began to implement the new investment process for existing portfolios, 
which involved divesting and reallocating assets. Only a few weeks later, however, difficulties appeared 
concerning SRI selectivity. Too many companies with a good financial profile were being excluded for 
SRI reasons, endangering financial performance by significantly reducing the investment universe. Asset 
                                                          
7 Measure of how closely a portfolio follows the index to which it is benchmarked. 
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managers had an obligation to respect the risk/diversification ratios inherent in constructing an optimal 
portfolio when selecting companies.8 Consequently, the SRI analysts and asset managers decided to 
reduce the proportion of companies excluded for SRI reasons alone (i.e., companies belonging to the 
“laggards” category), first to 40% and then to as low as 25%. Ten months after its launch, the working 
group was officially disbanded and the new investment process was deemed successful. This meant that 
the fund process was considered “good” compared to its peers and that the integration of ESG criteria 
generated adequate financial and SRI performance to justify added value, in comparison to other actively 
managed funds. 
 
Fixed-income working group 
 
In the fixed-income working group, the selection of companies and public issuers followed a three-
stage process. First, an SRI ranking was obtained by compiling SRI grades issued by two social rating 
agencies: one SRI ranking for OECD countries and one SRI ranking for companies belonging to the DJ 
Eurostoxx 600 index (the same analysis was used for equity investment); then, asset managers selected 
issuers according to their financial criteria; and thirdly, SRI analysts ensured that the portfolio’s overall SRI 
grade was above average, regardless of whether there were sovereign or corporate bonds. Since asset 
managers could also select companies that did not belong to the index, SRI analysts could not assess all 
companies included in the portfolio. 
 
During the first working group meeting, each department submitted its ideas to the other two 
departments. The sales representatives admitted they had few ideas. They had studied what competitors 
were doing and none seemed to be using a different investment process. However, they urged the other 
two departments to find a way to meet the growing client demand for SRI funds. The SRI analysts 
acknowledged their lack of experience in fixed-income investment but were keen to redesign the whole 
investment process in order to attain high SRI selectivity. The asset manager was against this idea, arguing 
that strengthening reference to ESG criteria would jeopardize the funds’ financial performance. 
                                                          
8 In theory, it is possible to construct an “efficient frontier” of optimal portfolios offering the maximum possible 
expected return for a given level of risk. A key principle of this theory is holding a diversified portfolio of assets in 
order to reduce the exposure to individual asset risk. Excluding companies for SRI reasons threatens this 
diversification by reducing the investment universe.   
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For weeks, the working group could not agree on what should be done. Two months after its first 
meeting, an SRI analyst and a sales representative decided to work informally on a new investment 
process. Believing that the SRI grade did not significantly influence the investment process, they asked the 
asset manager to change his way of selecting issuers to rely more on SRI grades. The asset manager 
responded that the request was unrealistic, adding that fixed-income investment was far more complicated 
than equity investment and that SRI analysts, lacking a financial background, could not understand the 
potential threat ESG criteria posed to financial performance. The SRI analyst and the sales representative 
felt that the asset manager had a condescending attitude. One month later, the working group became 
deadlocked and the asset manager refused to attend any further meetings. 
 
The sales representative and SRI analyst continued to work on the investment process, focusing on 
increasing SRI selectivity. After a few weeks, they had ideas for new ESG criteria but could not test them 
in practice. They realized that they did not know how the asset manager’s selection process worked. Once 
again, they analyzed competitors’ practices and clients’ demands, but the whole industry seemed to be in 
the same situation: nobody really knew what SRI should consist of. Discouraged by this lack of consensus, 
they abandoned the search. 
 
Five months after the launch of the working group, SRI Invest found itself in a predicament. Its very 
survival was threatened by the 2008 financial crisis. The SRI equity funds had lost almost half of their 
assets, which meant a 50% decrease in the company’s revenues. It was now imperative to redesign fixed-
income funds to meet the new invitations to tender that consequently favored fixed-income at the expense 
of equity investment. The CEO decided to re-launch the working group. He organized a brainstorming 
session during which all actors were required to contribute ideas, however extreme. The SRI analyst and 
sales representative who had been most active previously made several suggestions: 1) to change the SRI 
ranking of companies in the same way as the equity investment group; 2) to add new ESG criteria to the 
SRI ranking used for countries, and reframe it in a sector approach encompassing developed versus less 
developed countries; 3) to oblige asset managers to invest at least 70% of fund assets in companies 
assessed by SRI analysts; and 4) to exclude all issuers ranked as “SRI laggards.” The asset manager agreed 
with the first three proposals, but was strongly opposed to the last because he felt it would endanger 
financial performance. The SRI analysts openly complained about the redesign project, saying that 
financial performance was clearly being favored over SRI selectivity. The atmosphere became very tense. 
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The CEO did not want to endanger financial performance and asked the SRI analysts to find a better 
solution before adjourning the meeting and scheduling another for three days later. 
 
At the next meeting, an SRI analyst put forward a solution inspired by the “prudent mean” rules 
developed in the nineteenth century to limit the power of large shareholders in US corporations. It 
consisted of limiting the proportion of assets from a single issuer according to its SRI ranking (see Figure 
4). Issuers with the best SRI grades (referred to as category M1) had to make up at least X% of the 
portfolio’s assets, while the proportion of other issuers was limited. For instance, issuers from category 
Q1 could not make up more than Y%. This was a way to favor issuers with the best SRI profiles without 
excluding issuers with bad SRI profiles. Opinions differed as to the proportions, but everybody approved 
of the process. One month later, a new process had been redesigned on paper, ready for the asset manager 
to implement the following month. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Nine months after the working group’s initial launch, the SRI analyst and the sales representative 
who took over the group began to doubt whether the SRI constraint had any real influence. They voiced 
their concerns to the asset manager, who replied that he had significantly changed the way he selected the 
issuers out of respect for the SRI constraint. However, they were not convinced. Two months later, an 
informal discussion confirmed their impression: the asset manager declared that ESG criteria were useless 
in his investment activity. In his opinion, SRI was still meaningless for fixed-income investment and was 
nothing more than a formality to be complied with. To be of any use, he believed ESG criteria should 
resemble financial criteria and help him identify the companies most likely to go bankrupt. The SRI 
analysts advised that this was not possible. 
 
Findings 
 
SRI as enriching the financial logic or constraining it 
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After one year of process redesign, two different outcomes had emerged. The equity working group 
perceived SRI as relevant for their investment activity, whereas the fixed-income group questioned the 
added value of SRI in the investment processes: 
 
The good thing about fixed-income is that we can still greatly improve the process, 
because at the moment we’re in a pretty bad place. There are still things to do. The 
question is: “What does SRI bring to the process?” And I don’t know... […] We need 
more explanations of what fixed-income managers do, how they work, what a risk 
means for them. Once we’ve got that, we can start to think about what a true SRI 
process should be. (SRI analyst) 
 
However, when asked about the differences between the two working groups, SRI Invest members 
were vague. They found it difficult to explain exactly how the fixed-income working group was different. 
They began by explaining the divergences between the working groups in terms of power relationships: 
 
For SRI to be deeply integrated into the [equity investment] selection processes, right 
from the moment companies were selected, the asset manager had to validate the 
investment process that was proposed in the working group. He had to accept it, be 
fully committed to the redesign, see and say if this would impact his tracking error, 
etc. […] In the fixed-income group, I would say the opposite applied. It was the asset 
manager who won, but I wanted that to be the case because I didn’t believe that such 
integration of SRI was feasible in fixed-income. […] Honestly, I don’t see how SRI 
could play anything but a marginal or minority role in fixed-income. (CEO) 
 
What happened in the working groups confirmed this assertion. The fixed-income manager clearly 
resisted the redesign process, as evidenced by his leaving the working group in November 2007. However, 
when the CEO decided to re-launch the fixed-income working group because of the financial crisis, the 
asset manager had no choice but to change his investment activity. SRI analysts were forced to adapt to 
the constraints the asset manager set, which included not being allowed to exclude SRI laggards. However, 
the equity working group made a similar adaption, although it appeared to be made more willingly, when 
 21 
 
SRI selectivity was lowered from 50% to 40% and then 25%. In both working groups, the SRI analysts 
had to adapt to the position of the asset manager and vice versa. For example, the fixed-income manager 
was not allowed to “gamble” (i.e., invest 10% of the fund’s assets) on any company considered a laggard 
in terms of SRI. Yet this situation did occur a few times, and occasionally proved costly in terms of 
financial performance. In both groups, all parties had to compromise to progress the redesign of the 
investment process. 
 
Despite the investment constraints, there was a feeling that SRI had hardly influenced fixed-income 
investment at all. As noted above, the CEO felt SRI had only a marginal role in fixed-income investment, 
whereas SRI was integral to the selection processes for equity investment. This analysis was confirmed by 
the doubts expressed by the SRI analyst and sales representative over the real impact of SRI on the fixed-
income manager’s practices. Consequently, the fixed-income situation could be interpreted in terms of 
“decoupling” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Since financial and SRI demands proved contradictory, SRI Invest 
could be seen as decoupling its symbolic displays from its technical operations. But this interpretation 
would be misleading for two reasons. First, the fixed-income manager was investing subject to constraints 
and his practices were affected by ESG criteria. Second, it would be difficult to tell whether the equity 
manager was subject to more constraints than the fixed-income manager. Is an obligation not to invest 
more than 10% of fund assets in a single company, when there are in fact few alternatives available on the 
market, a lesser constraint than excluding 25% of companies from a universe of 300? It is a difficult 
question to answer. 
 
Actually, when the CEO stated that SRI played “a marginal or minority role” in fixed-income 
investment, he was not referring to the impact of SRI on investment practices themselves but to SRI’s 
effect on how the financial logic was understood and instantiated within this type of product. While the 
financial logic of equity investment was enriched by the new demands for SRI, the financial logic of fixed-
income investment remained almost unchanged, maintaining a view according to which SRI demands 
threatened financial performance. A discussion with each asset manager about what SRI brought to their 
“identities and valuation orders” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) clearly illustrates this difference. 
 
Discussion with the equity manager: 
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RESEARCHER: Has the incorporation of SRI changed the way you invest? 
EQUITY MANAGER: Yes. It’s made it more interesting, more elaborate and it enhances 
the investment activity. […] It’s surprising, but you sometimes see companies with a 
very good financial profile and a very bad SRI profile. When you read financial 
analyses, they appear to be excellent. But when you listen to the SRI analysts, they 
describe things that aren’t working inside those companies. So I wonder how such 
companies can succeed at the end of the day. How can they make up for bad working 
conditions, for example? 
RESEARCHER: So you like managing SRI funds? 
EQUITY MANAGER: Yes, I do. I hope that this type of management will be fully 
recognized one day. […] 
RESEARCHER: So you feel that you are an SRI equity asset manager? 
EQUITY MANAGER: Yes. That’s how I perceive myself, and it’s how I introduce 
myself. 
 
Discussion with the fixed-income manager: 
 
RESEARCHER: What does SRI mean for you? 
FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: It’s a constraint you have to abide by when investing, like 
any constraint. 
RESEARCHER: When a constraint applies, is it difficult to manage? 
FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: It’s always difficult to manage a constraint. 
RESEARCHER: Is that because it’s an SRI constraint? 
FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: No, no. It’s not linked to the fact that it’s an SRI 
constraint. 
RESEARCHER: OK. So SRI is a constraint like any other constraint. But does it 
contribute anything to your investment activity? 
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FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: Personally, I don’t think so. 
 
The difference between the two asset managers’ interpretations of the role of SRI in investment 
activity was substantial. The equity manager judged that SRI had enriched investment activity by making it 
more interesting and more elaborate. He believed SRI had expanded his knowledge of companies. He 
took ESG criteria into consideration when selecting companies because he felt that those criteria bolstered 
his financial analysis by providing new information. His cognitive operations and the selection, projection, 
and evaluation of the outcomes of market transactions (Preda, 2009) had been transformed. Furthermore, 
he introduced himself as an SRI equity manager, meaning his professional identity, too, had changed. 
Hence, the “identities and valuation orders” (i.e., the financial logic) (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) of equity 
investment had come to incorporate SRI concerns. 
 
In contrast, the fixed-income manager described SRI in terms of constraints and did not relate SRI to 
his selection process. To him, the content of the constraint made no difference because it did not 
influence his investment activity. It was a constraint like any other. In contrast to the situation in equity 
investment, SRI had not penetrated the financial logic of fixed-income investment. Neither the asset 
manager’s cognitive operations nor identity had changed. He selected companies according to his previous 
financial logic, and then adapted his choices to meet the SRI constraint. Therefore, contrary to the spirit 
of SRI, the fixed-income manager did not believe SRI was a key element of a successful investment 
strategy. The CEO explained: 
 
This brings us back to the fundamental problem. In equity, everybody can understand 
that SRI is a positive thing for investment activity; it’s intrinsically linked to the 
management of companies. […] But to all the fixed-income managers in Paris, and 
almost all the fixed-income managers in the world, integrating SRI into investment 
activity means nothing. (CEO) 
 
Different “clusters of evaluation practices” 
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The fundamental difference between the two groups results from the fact that the transformation of 
the fixed-income process following the new demands for SRI meant nothing to the asset manager. A key 
element to understanding this difference concerns the added value that SRI brings to the issuer selection 
process. While it helped the equity manager select the companies most likely to succeed, the fixed-income 
manager perceived it to be meaningless. This divergent opinion clearly reflects the differences in terms of 
“clusters of evaluation practices” (MacKenzie, 2011) associated with the calculative devices used in each 
type of product. The CEO explained: 
 
There’s something abstract about fixed income; it’s an actuarial model […] fixed 
income can’t be embodied in reality, so it’s difficult to incorporate SRI. […] In equity, 
there’s an idea of durability, effort, success and long-term existence for the fund that 
embodies SRI. In fixed income, all investments involve permanent arbitrage9, so 
there’s total volatility. It’s very difficult to embody something that is linked to 
sustainability in an investment that is, by design, volatile. (CEO) 
 
When equity managers select a company for a fund, they believe that the company will succeed and 
generate profits, which will contribute to an increase in shareholder value. Managers must invest in all 
sectors in order to spread the risk, and therefore aim to select the two or three companies in each industry 
that appear to be the most financially promising in the long run. They first identify potentially interesting 
companies in each industry in the investment universe concerned, and then select the most profitable 
companies in each industry based on their own criteria, company knowledge, and personal experience, in 
compliance with the risk and financial ratios set at the portfolio level. This usually leads to adjustments in 
the industry weightings within portfolios. 
 
Fixed-income managers, in contrast, lend money to a borrower for a defined period of time. In this 
case, the goal is to select the issuers that offer the best interest rate and the best likelihood of reimbursing 
the loan. If a company goes bankrupt, the asset manager loses all the money lent. The issuers may be 
private companies or public institutions, such as countries or cities. Although a bankruptcy risk also exists 
in equity investment, it is not considered to be as important owing to the different perceptions of risks in 
                                                          
9 Arbitrage is the practice of taking advantage of a price difference between two or more markets.  
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the two types of investments. Fixed-income investment is judged to be very safe, since the return is a 
given; it is therefore of primary importance that its only risk — that of default on payment — should be 
very well managed.10 On the contrary, the goal of equity investment is to generate excess returns (the 
“alpha”) for which investors are prepared to take more risks, including the risk of bankruptcy. What 
matters is achieving the expected performance. 
 
The interest rates used in fixed-income investment change over time for a variety of reasons, most of 
them macroeconomic. For example, if there are few actors in the market with free cash to lend, the issuer 
will have to offer a higher rate of interest. Consequently, there is an inverse relationship between interest 
rates and bond prices. A fixed-income manager therefore relies heavily on the yield curve (see Figure 5) 
and actuarial models, rather than other financial and business criteria. Given the importance of these 
models, fixed-income investment can be described as far more mathematically driven than equity 
investment. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
It follows that how companies and countries react to climate change or human rights issues, for 
example, does not affect the fixed-income manager’s investment decisions, since those reactions influence 
interest rates only marginally. Instead, such reactions are expected to contribute to an increase in the 
company’s share value in the future, a factor of primary importance to the equity manager. This is the 
reason why the CEO says that the effort of a company will be rewarded in equity investment by success, 
whereas investment decisions in fixed-income investment will be principally influenced by arbitrage 
benefits. 
 
                                                          
10 The debt crisis that followed obviously contributed to the questioning of some strong beliefs shared in fixed-
income investment. 
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The perception of reality as abstract (i.e., decoupled from the actual behavior of issuers) is reinforced 
by the relationship of fixed-income investment to time. An equity investment manager buying shares is 
interested in the future increase in their stock market value. In this case, the idea conveyed by SRI makes 
sense: if a company anticipates and plans for costs linked to below-average performance in ESG domains, 
it is more likely to succeed and see its share value increase. The use of ESG criteria can expand the equity 
asset manager’s knowledge of companies, providing additional information for calculative devices and 
cognitive operations, and therefore investment decisions. 
 
In contrast, the interest rates studied by the fixed-income manager usually depend on the company’s 
present borrowing capacity and market conditions. The company’s future success in fixed-income 
investment is less important than it is for equity investment. The financial performance of fixed-income 
investment results less from an asset manager’s ability to anticipate which companies are more likely to 
succeed than from the ability to constantly take advantage of a price differential between different markets. 
In other words, fixed-income investment is more concerned with change than stability. This explains why 
it is described as volatile and why the long-term rewards approach advanced by SRI is meaningless. In 
fact, the only time when future considerations affect fixed-income investment decisions is when an asset 
manager tries to anticipate whether a company or country could go bankrupt and default on payment, but 
this information could not be provided by SRI analysts (further explanations for this are given in the next 
section). 
 
The perceived lack of appropriate calculative devices 
 
The previous section showed that the differences between the distinctive presuppositions about the 
nature and properties of the economic world between the two types of evaluations practices and 
calculative devices (MacKenzie, 2011, p. 1783) explain why SRI is next to meaningless in fixed-income 
investment compared to equity investment. However, it did not clarify why ESG criteria were unable to 
identify which companies were most likely to go bankrupt, the main area of fixed-income investment 
where SRI could make a contribution. Interestingly, the fixed-income manager explicitly asked the SRI 
analysts to provide him with this information, but they found it impossible. 
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I found it very positive, except for the content of the request. I remember very clearly 
that he asked us to identify the factors that will impact a company’s value. So in short, 
he asked us to find the “philosopher’s stone” of SRI. […] To find the essence that all 
asset management companies are looking for today, an essence they aren’t finding. 
They aren’t finding it because it’s a bit too early, there are no historical data and they 
find it difficult to identify all these things. (SRI analyst) 
 
According to the SRI analyst, the lack of historical data explains why no relationship had yet been 
identified connecting ESG criteria and the probability of going bankrupt. One way of understanding this 
problem was to ask the fixed-income asset manager what form the ESG criteria should have taken for it 
to be more helpful: 
 
RESEARCHER: So, in theory, ESG criteria could be useful for you but they’re no help 
at the moment? 
FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: Exactly, since we don’t have anything to measure them, 
there’s no point in looking at them [ESG criteria]. […] I think that [social] rating 
agencies are totally incapable of doing this. […] They [ESG criteria] are so 
approximate that it’s impossible to rely on them. 
RESEARCHER: You mean that finance is much more reliable? 
FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: I think so. First, there are a lot more obligations that 
concern finance: very simple things such as publishing the accounts, having them 
certified, etcetera. […] The data are comparable; they’ve existed for a very long time. 
It’s arithmetical, not qualitative. They aren’t declarations or protocols… but concrete 
information we can verify. 
RESEARCHER: So you can rely on financial criteria, but you cannot rely on ESG 
criteria? 
FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: Yes, in order to work, ESG criteria should be like 
financial criteria. The social rating process should be like the financial one. 
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The problem here relates to the form and content of ESG criteria. If ESG criteria are not reliable 
because fixed-asset managers cannot measure them, how can an equity manager rely on them? The 
explanation lies in their different calculative devices and associated evaluation practices. A fixed-income 
manager has a mathematical background and relies mainly on actuarial models, and will therefore probably 
expect criteria to be arithmetical rather than qualitative. Fixed income managers cannot deal with 
qualitative factors such as ESG criteria because they cannot be included in the calculative devices they use 
(e.g., econometric models). Equity managers, in contrast, rely far more on personal knowledge and 
experience. They are used to relying as much on financial criteria as on other business criteria such as 
governance and social issues, and can therefore more easily integrate ESG criteria into their investment 
decisions. 
 
Another problem mentioned by the fixed-income manager is that ESG criteria were first framed on 
equity investment’s calculative devices and evaluation practices; that is, according to a sector-based 
approach. Indeed, an equity manager aims to select the most financially- and socially-responsible firms in 
each sector (with no sector excluded). However, this sector-based approach to ESG criteria actually 
prevented the fixed-income manager from incorporating SRI into investment decisions. To better 
understand why, Figure 5 provides an example of the sector-based ranking used by SRI analysts compiling 
the different social ratings bought by SRI Invest and the personal analysis of its SRI analysts, and Figure 6 
provides an example of a company factsheet that summarizes the financial and SRI profile of a company. 
First, we can see that the same analysis is used for both equity and fixed-income investment in the case of 
corporate issuers. Second, we can clearly see that the types of financial and ESG ratios in use are those 
useful for the evaluation practices of equity at the expense of fixed-income investment (with the exception 
of the financial structure ratios). For instance, it is difficult to identify a direct relationship between SRI 
ratings and the yield curve (see Figure 5). 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figures 6 and 7 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Taking the example of climate change, imagine company X and company Y, respectively rated 
55/100 and 45/100 on the “CO2 emissions” criteria. The 10-point difference might, for example, be a 
result of company Y having set no reduction targets. When reporting these ratings to asset managers, SRI 
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analysts also offer commentary. They may advise against investing in company Y, or explain that the rating 
is one year old and does not reflect the company’s recent efforts, and therefore recommend company Y 
instead of company X despite the latter’s poorer grade. 
 
An equity manager would consult SRI analysts to identify companies that are more likely to have high 
CO2 emissions: information that asset managers might find useful in selecting which company can be 
successful in the future. In this case, both SRI and financial analyses would be included in company 
selection because ESG criteria are deemed to affect business. The equity manager explained: 
 
I don’t want to keep a sort of watertight division between SRI analysis and my 
analysis. I want them to be correlated. Otherwise, it would mean that I select issuers 
on criteria I can’t verify at all, and that wouldn’t be credible for clients. (Equity 
manager) 
 
A fixed-income manager, on the other hand, would ask SRI analysts which company would be more 
likely to go bankrupt and what to do if only one company offers bonds. But SRI analysts cannot answer 
because it is too early to say. No relationship has yet been identified between issues like CO2 emission 
levels and the probability of a company going bankrupt. Furthermore, ESG criteria were developed to 
facilitate comparisons within sectors. Should the asset manager favor an automobile company with a good 
SRI profile over a clean tech company with a bad SRI profile? SRI analysts cannot advise on that. In other 
words, ESG criteria do not currently provide the information the fixed-income manager would consider 
relevant to investment decisions. Based on these findings, it can be argued that the perceived lack of ESG 
criteria corresponding to the evaluation practices and calculative devices of fixed-income investment 
largely explains why the financial logic embodied in fixed-income logic was not enriched by the new 
demands for SRI. 
 
Discussion 
 
This article has focused on the micro-mechanisms through which the investment practices of two 
different products embedded within the same financial logic unfolded over time following new demands 
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for SRI. The previous section detailed why SRI Invest personnel perceived that the logic, practices, and 
instruments associated with equity investment were enriched by the integration of SRI while viewing those 
of fixed-income investment as remaining almost the same, so that SRI was perceived as an external 
constraint that just had to be accepted. This section explores the implications of these findings for 
theorizing the role of instruments in the transformation of a logic and its associated practices. 
 
The mechanisms through which instruments can mediate the transformation of a logic and its associated practices 
 
Previous research has shown that disentangling the relationships between logics, practices, and 
instruments is an extremely difficult task, both empirically and theoretically. This is explained by the fact 
that practices are material instantiations of logics (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 128). Nevertheless, analysis of 
how the two working groups aimed to integrate the new demands for SRI in their financial logics provides 
evidence that, though they remain analytically distinct, instruments, practices, and logics are bound 
together in a recursive relationship. It also suggests that instruments specifically mediate the relationships 
between logics and their associated practices. 
 
The mutual relationships among financial logics, instruments, and practices are illustrated by the 
(in)ability of actors to transform what MacKenzie (2011) referred to as “the cluster of evaluation 
practices” associated with each type of investment. On the one hand, the evaluation practices and their 
associated ontologies — notably, the relationships between investment decisions and the real economy — 
influenced the design of the calculative devices used in the evaluation and valuation processes, which then 
reinforced the existing material instantiations of the financial logic. This is evident in the inability of the 
working group to integrate ESG criteria into the econometric models used by the fixed-income managers, 
resulting in the continuation of the established evaluation practices. On the other hand, the features of 
calculative devices influenced the observation, analysis, and calculation processes through which the asset 
managers made decisions. The equity manager, for instance, was able to transform financial practices by 
incorporating ESG criteria into the decision matrix, which then led him to integrate SRI into the financial 
logic itself. In other words, instruments both shaped and were shaped by the existing logic and practices; 
they acted as mediating instruments (Miller & O’Leary, 2007) between the logic and its associated 
practices. 
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To argue that the logics, instruments, and practices are interlinked, however, requires them not to be 
identical. The fact that mediating instruments are distinct from their objects of intervention (Miller & 
O’Leary, 2007) is exemplified by the fact that all calculative devices (e.g., ESG criteria, econometric 
models, SRI/financial decision matrices, etc.) existed independently of their uses in investment practices 
and their meanings for actors. This shows that although calculative devices embodied how actors made 
sense of the financial logics, instruments were different from the overall principles that guided behavior in 
each type of investment and from the actual practices of the actors involved. 
 
To distinguish between a financial logic and its associated practices — specifically the clusters of 
evaluation practices (MacKenzie, 2011) — seems far more difficult. This is because evaluation practices 
are defined as “distinctive presuppositions about the nature and properties of the features and processes 
of the economic world” (MacKenzie, 2011, p. 1783). This definition is similar to the notion of “evaluation 
cultures” (i.e., “aggregate patterns and dynamics that are on display in expert practice and that vary in 
different settings of expertise” (Knorr-Cetina, 1999, p. 8)) and to the definition of logics: the principles 
that guide behavior in a social situation, providing actors with frames of reference that precondition their 
sense-making, acting, and identity choices (Thornton et al., 2012; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, 
2002). 
 
These similar definitions further demonstrate the close relationships between the logics and their 
material instantiations in practice. This does not mean, however, that actors are not able to perform 
practices that are not guided by the dominant logic of the industry, and/or to propose new guidance. If 
that were the case, institutional change would not be possible. For instance, the integration of ESG criteria 
into the evaluation practices of the equity asset managers followed their understanding of the financial 
logic for this type of investment — that integrating non-financial criteria should help identify those 
companies more likely to succeed — but also transformed the financial logic itself by reinforcing the need 
for investment decisions to benefit from and serve a sustainable economy. This shows that although the 
financial logic provided the rationale for transforming their calculative devices and also investment and 
evaluation practices, the actual transformations of those instruments and practices subsequently led to a 
transformation of the financial logic. In contrast, while the fixed-income managers did transform their 
investment practices by adding an SRI constraint, they did not integrate SRI concerns into the “identities 
and valuation orders” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 805) that structured their decision making. SRI 
appeared to be an external constraint on the financial logic. 
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Based on these findings, it can be argued that instruments, practices, and logics are bound together in 
a recursive relationship, while being theoretically and empirically different. Two relationships among the 
three elements are then possible: either they are linked to one other directly and/or indirectly, or one 
element mediates the relationship between the other two. The definition of a mediating instrument would 
tend to naturally argue for the second form of relationship: that instruments connect arenas and actors 
(Miller & O’Leary, 2007; Miller & Power, 2013). However, it could also be argued that practices mediate 
between logics and instruments. To conclude this argument would definitely require further research on 
the relationships between the three elements. 
 
However, the observations and the way the actors explained how they transformed their practices 
and the associated financial logic indicated that actors always thought and acted through their instruments. 
For instance, they redesigned their investment processes through the use of PowerPoint presentations that 
schematized what they were doing, which then helped them re-think the financial logic. They also 
transformed their evaluation practices through the transformation of existing (and the creation of new) 
calculative devices, such as the decision matrix and the creation of new ESG criteria. Instruments seemed 
to act as performative supports without which transforming the financial logic and/or its associated 
practices would have been impossible. This is the reason why this article positions instruments as a 
medium for transforming the logic and its associated practices. 
 
The conditions under which the co-transformation of the logic, practices, and instruments is possible 
 
 The mechanisms through which both working groups aimed to transform their investment practices 
following the new demands for SRI were similar: instruments, logics, and their associated practices were 
bound in a recursive relationship. However, the outcomes differed in that SRI was integrated into the 
financial logic of equity investment but remained an external constraint in fixed-income investment. The 
analysis reported above identified several reasons explaining this difference, particularly the perception of 
the lack of appropriate calculative devices in the fixed-income investment sphere. Based on these findings, 
this section aims to further explore why these devices could not mediate the transformation of the 
financial logic and associated practices in fixed-income investment. It identifies two features of the 
instruments that are suggested to be key to the transformation of equity investment that were lacking in 
the fixed-income investment arena: the perceived flexibility and incompleteness of the calculative devices in 
use. 
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Two features of the calculative devices used in equity investment appeared essential to their 
performative nature: they made asset managers and SRI analysts work together, and they helped generate 
new knowledge that enriched previous practices. Indeed, for SRI to be integrated into the practices and 
logic of equity investment, it was important that SRI analysts and asset managers could cooperate and that 
new knowledge about how to transform investment activity in response to the demand for SRI could 
emerge from this cooperation. Several means were used to achieve this, such as holding weekly meetings 
to raise issues and suggest new ideas, routine informal discussions, and involving SRI analysts in 
invitations to tender. Although these means were clearly facilitators, ultimately the key factor explaining 
the greater integration of SRI into the financial logic of equity investment was the design of a new 
calculative device: the SRI/Financial decision matrix (see Figure 2). 
 
The decision matrix design made cross-disciplinary work possible by providing a catalyst for 
discussion between SRI analysts and asset managers, and to a lesser extent project managers, all of whom 
were involved in responding to client demands. Throughout the redesign process, SRI analysts and asset 
managers explained, compared, shared, and finally merged their own calculative devices into this decision 
matrix. This was possible because the calculative devices were flexible, in that they were sufficiently open-
ended and malleable to enable both SRI and financial concerns to be integrated into the investment 
processes. For instance, asset managers added ESG criteria to their financial analysis and SRI analysts 
framed ESG criteria according to asset managers’ financial constraints. Both managers and analysts 
worked on how to set decision matrix ratios that respected the risk diversification policy suggested by 
portfolio theory. The fact that the asset manager was used to referring to qualitative criteria in his 
investment decision process clearly facilitated this alignment of understandings and interests, together with 
the fact that ESG criteria had first been framed for equity investment (as evidenced by the sector-based 
approach). 
 
The decision matrix design also contributed to the generation of new knowledge about companies, 
on how to select companies, and on how to sell that company selection to clients. This generation of new 
knowledge led the asset manager to perceive SRI as an enhancement to investment activity and its 
associated logic. A new approach emerged because asset managers and SRI analysts did not perceive their 
existing calculative devices as fixed and constant, but instead as incomplete and open-ended (Nicolini, 
Mengis, & Swan, 2012). They believed that improvement was possible. In particular, both asset managers 
and SRI analysts were intrigued by the fact that they could not explain why some companies with very bad 
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SRI grades performed well financially, and vice versa. The search for understanding prompted 
cooperation and created mutual dependencies. 
 
Two factors facilitated the emergent and expansive nature of these instruments: the future 
orientation of calculative devices and their somewhat lower relative importance than human agency in the 
investment decision process. The SRI analysts and the asset manager believed the redesign project was 
worthwhile because they thought better financial performance could be generated in the long-term as a 
result of including ESG criteria (it also resulted from the relationships between equity investment and the 
real economy). Moreover, though constrained by their calculative devices when investing — and especially 
by the risk ratios suggested by portfolio theory — the equity asset manages was independent enough of 
those devices to consider changing them and trusting more in his own knowledge, experience, and 
intuition. 
 
In contrast, fixed-income investment relies heavily on quantitative calculative devices. Ideally, 
econometric models would act as a substitute for human agency, making the investment process as 
rational as possible. There was understandably strong resistance to any intervention that might threaten 
this scientific basis; the introduction of qualitative ESG criteria, which appear less objective and reliable 
than financial criteria, was not positively received. Because the fixed-income group believed that the 
existing models could not be improved upon, this hindered the generation of new knowledge. The 
situation might have been different if a systematic relationship had been identified between ESG criteria 
and the probability of an issuer going bankrupt, but this was not possible. Consequently, despite the 
financial crisis and the potential knowledge that could be generated by exploring this relationship, the 
existing calculative devices in fixed-income investment remained largely uncontested. This shows that one 
way of sustaining an institutional logic is by cementing the unquestioned status of its associated 
instruments. 
 
Another factor was that those calculative devices were very difficult to unpack. Despite repeated 
requests, the SRI analyst and project manager failed to obtain detailed information about the models used 
by the fixed-income manager, who said it was all too technical for analysts and project managers with little 
financial background. So the fixed-income manager’s calculative devices remained black boxes. This 
obviously did not facilitate collaboration between the asset management and SRI departments. The SRI 
analysts found it almost impossible to integrate qualitative and sector-based criteria into what seemed to 
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them to be impenetrable, inflexible econometric models. The rigid nature of calculative devices therefore 
also resulted from the perceived inaccessibility of the calculative devices. Both dimensions contribute to 
explaining why ESG criteria remained an ex-post constraint that did not help asset managers select issuers 
and why calculative devices could not be merged. 
 
The differences between how calculative devices were transformed in equity compared to fixed-
income investment have ontological implications. In equity investment, the fusion of financial and SRI 
calculative devices enabled the alignment of the two ontologies associated with each type of calculative 
devices. Because instruments provide the evaluation through which reality is valued, SRI has become 
valuable in financial terms. The new calculative devices in use came to be shaped by both financial and 
SRI values and shaped practices and the financial logic accordingly. In other words, they were mediating 
instruments. In fixed-income investment, both ontologies (i.e., finance and SRI) remained separate as a 
consequence of the separation between calculative devices. The lack of transformation of the financial 
calculative devices used in fixed-income investment prevented asset managers from perceiving economic 
reality in a different way and SRI was perceived to be valueless in financial terms. As MacKenzie explained 
(2011, p. 1783), different evaluation practices sustain different “presuppositions about the nature and 
properties of the features and processes of the economic world”. The creation of the new calculative 
devices in fixed-income investment did not enable the commensurability of SRI and financial values and 
evaluations: they did not trigger ontological change. 
 
The above findings suggest that some features of calculative devices facilitate their roles as channels 
for the transformation of practices and its associated logic, providing some conditions under which this 
co-transformation is possible. This relationship is summarized in Figure 8. However, the identification of 
these two conditions does not mean that other factors, such as the unwillingness of fixed-income asset 
managers to collaborate with SRI analysts and the type of cluster of evaluation practices, did not play a 
role. As shown above, these elements are bound into a recursive relationship. For instance, the view of the 
fixed-income investment’s calculative devices as impenetrable black boxes also resulted from the 
conviction of actors that they could not be transformed. That is why it is very important to understand 
that it is above all the belief on the part of actors that ESG criteria were impossible to incorporate into the 
econometric models of fixed-income investment processes that led to the lack of integration of SRI into 
the financial logic. There could conceivably have been a different outcome if the fixed-income manager 
had believed in the ability of SRI analysts to help forecast debt problems. This shows that instruments 
acquire their performative nature rather than it being somehow inherent. It is the relationships among 
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instruments, practices, and institutional logics that determine whether those instruments will have 
performative effects and if they do, of what kind they will be.11 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
  
                                                          
11 Obviously, drawing firm conclusions based on one case study is difficult, especially since the asset management 
industry relies heavily on calculative devices, which explains their central role in this article. The model proposed by 
the article is therefore a proposition that would require further testing.  
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Conclusion 
 
This article sought to show that the fashioning of new calculative devices is an essential process through 
which practices change, and thereby potentially change an institutional logic. However, the nature of the 
calculative devices, the identities of actors, the organizational practices, and the institutional logic all 
depend on one another. The fashioning of new calculative devices enabled the integration of SRI in equity 
investment in a way it did not in fixed-income investment. This was due primarily to the different ways in 
which the actors understood the instruments and their relationships to the financial logic. Introducing a 
new calculative device does not tell us enough about the way it will be shaped and shape practices and the 
institutional logic. This work suggests potentially productive intersections between accounting and 
institutional literatures. Institutional theorists need to take accounting seriously both as a site in which to 
observe institutional change and as a medium through which it is effected. Reciprocally, accounting 
theorists can develop better accounts of the productivity of these instruments by specifying the way in 
which they articulate with changes in practices and as media for the transformation of institutional logics.  
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APPENDIX A 
WHAT IS AN SRI FUND? 
 
An SRI (Socially Responsible Investment) fund is an entity that collects money from investors 
(institutional or individual) in order to invest it in transferable securities (shares, bonds, etc.). Every fund 
must obtain clearance from the financial authorities. To receive clearance, funds must comply with several 
financial and risk ratios known as the “fund profile,” and disclose this information. An asset manager runs 
each fund and decides where and when to invest money according to the fund’s “investment process” (see 
below). An investor deciding to invest in an SRI fund is often interested in several criteria, summarized as 
follows: 
− Assets under management: the total must be at least ten times greater than the assets in which the 
client wants to invest. 
− Financial performance: the fund must “beat the market,” which means that its financial 
performance must exceed the benchmark index and competing fund performances. 
− Management fees: the asset management company’s fees must be as low as possible. 
− Investment processes: these must convince clients of the asset management company’s ability to 
achieve better financial performance. They must also demonstrate that the most socially 
responsible companies are selected for the portfolio. This means the asset management company 
must provide evidence of its unique expertise by offering sophisticated investment processes, 
selecting companies through the complex use of calculative devices such as financial models and 
ESG criteria. Often, the investment process of an SRI fund follows a three-stage approach: 1) 
financial and SRI analysis; 2) definition of an “investment universe” which comprises all 
companies in which asset managers can invest; and 3) application of decision criteria by asset 
managers to select companies from this investment universe. 
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APPENDIX B 
PARTICIPATIVE OBSERVATION AT THE INDUSTRY LEVEL 
 
 Organization Events Date 
  
1 Broker C SRI Road Show  18/01/07 
2 Think-Tank A Working Group on CSR12 Corporate Governance Code 23/01/07 
3 Think-Tank A Working Group on CSR Corporate Governance Code 20/01/07 
4 Social Rating Agency 2006 Annual Meetings / Conference 22/02/07 
5 Employers Lobby A Meeting for CSR Corporate Governance Code 28/02/07 
6 Employers Lobby B Meeting for CSR Corporate Governance Code 05/03/07 
7 Think-Tank A  Governance and financial communication (Conference) 14/03/07 
8 Think-Tank A Working Group on CSR Corporate Governance Code 20/03/07 
9 Think-Tank B Working Group on SRI 28/03/07 
10 Think-Tank C  Working Group on Shareholder activism 13/04/07 
11 Think-Tank A Working Group on CSR Corporate Governance Code 24/04/07 
12 European Commission Meeting for CSR Corporate Governance Code 07/05/07 
13 Think-Tank B Working Group on SRI 04/05/07 
14 Bank A  Annual Meeting 14/05/07 
15 Think-Tank A Working Group on CSR Corporate Governance Code 22/05/07 
16 Consulting Firm C Implementing CSR in the companies (Conference) 12/06/07 
17 French SRI Lobby  Annual Conference 12/06/07 
18 Think-Tank A Governance in listed companies (Conference) 25/06/07 
19 Think-Tank B SRI and Retail (Conference) 27/06/07 
20 Think-Tank C Working group on CSR 05/07/07 
21 Think-Tank C Working group on CSR 10/07/07 
22 Think-Tank C Working group on CSR 12/07/07 
                                                          
12 Corporate Social Responsibility 
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 Organization Events Date 
23 Think-Tank D  Working group on CSR 20/07/07 
24 Think-Tank D Working group on CSR 06/09/07 
25 Think-Tank C Working group on CSR 20/09/07 
26 Think-Tank A CSR in the CAC 40 Boards (Conference) 03/10/07 
27 Broker B SRI Road Show 30/10/07 
28 Social Rating Agency E Meeting 05/11/07 
29 Invitation to tender A Meeting 13/11/07 
30 Social Rating Agency F Meeting 16/11/07 
31 Social Rating Agency G Meeting 22/11/07 
32 Think-Tank C Working group on CSR 04/12/07 
33 Think-Tank B Working Group on SRI 06/12/07 
34 Think-Tank C Working Group on SRI 06/12/07 
35 Think-Tank C SRI in Fixed-Income Management (Conference) 20/12/07 
36 Invitation to tender B Meeting 11/01/08 
37 Social Rating Agency A Meeting 15/01/08 
38 Think-Tank B SRI (Conference) 30/01/08 
39 Think-Tank B Working Group on SRI 21/02/08 
40 Think-Tank C CSR (Conference) 02/04/08 
41 Broker B SRI Road Show 08/04/08 
42 Consulting Firm D CSR Road Show 10/04/08 
43 NGO B Meeting 15/04/08 
44 European SRI Lobby  Working group on SRI 17/04/08 
45 Invitation to tender C Meeting 06/05/08 
46 European SRI Lobby  Working group on SRI 13/05/08 
47 European Mutual Insurance Lobby Working group on SRI 16/05/08 
48 Invitation to tender D Meeting 19/05/08 
49 Bank E Annual Meeting 22/05/08 
50 Bank A Annual Meeting 27/05/08 
51 Consulting Firm E SRI Conference 03/06/08 
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 Organization Events Date 
52 Think-Tank B Working group on SRI 16/06/08 
53 Asset Management Company C SRI Funds of funds (Conference) 17/06/08 
54 Broker A SRI Road Show 18/06/08 
55 Consulting Firm F SRI Analysis Products Presentation  19/06/08 
56 Social Rating Agency B Meeting 26/06/08 
57 Asset Management Company E Meeting 02/07/08 
58 Social Rating Agency B Meeting 03/07/08 
59 Social Rating Agency A Meeting 08/07/08 
60 Invitation to tender E Meeting 11/07/08 
61 Think-Tank E Working group on SRI 22/07/08 
62 Proxy (Manifest) Business Meeting 05/02/09 
63 Conference CSR 06/02/09 
64 Conference SRI & Institutional Investors 12/02/09 
65 Meeting/Business Development Asset management company A 05/03/09 
66 Conference Greenwashing  10/03/09 
67 Meeting/Business Development Asset management company B 24/03/09 
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APPENDIX C 
INTERVIEWS 
 
 Organization Function Date Time Recorded 
  
 Asset Management Companies 
  
1 Asset Management Company A  Head of SRI 13/10/06 1h00 No 
2 Asset Management Company B  Head of SRI  13/11/07 1h13 Yes 
3 Asset Management Company C  Head of SRI 01/08/07 1h15 Yes 
4 
5 
Asset Management Company D 
Asset Management Company D 
CEO 
SRI Analyst 
06/09/08 
06/09/08 
1h10 
1h10 
Yes 
Yes 
6 Asset Management Company E Head of European Fund 
Distribution & CEO France 
05/02/09 1h00 Yes 
7 Asset Management Company D Equities Manager 09/03/09 1h28 Yes 
8 Asset Management Company D Fixed-Income Manager 09/03/09 0h44 Yes 
9 Asset Management Company D Head of SRI & 
Development 
13/03/09 1h45 Yes 
10 Asset Management Company D CEO 13/03/09 1h55 Yes 
11 Asset Management Company D SRI Analyst 16/03/09 1h31 Yes 
12 Asset Management Company D SRI Development 
Management 
19/03/09 0h59 Yes 
13 Asset Management Company D Executive 19/03/09 0h30 Yes 
14 Asset Management Company D SRI Analyst 19/03/09 1h05 Yes 
  
 CSR Departments 
  
15 Bank A  Head of Corporate CSR  09/08/07 1h02 Yes 
16 Bank B  Project Manager 28/02/08 1h27 Yes 
17 Insurance Company C  CSR Group / Project 
Manager (2)  
19/02/08 1h22 Yes 
18 Insurance Company C  CSR France / Project 09/06/08 1h05 Yes 
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 Organization Function Date Time Recorded 
Manager  
19 Insurance Company D  Head of Corporate CSR  26/10/07 2h00 Yes 
20 Insurance Company D  Project Manager 11/03/08 1h52 Yes 
21 Other company A  Project Manager / CSR 
Group 
26/11/07 0h58 Yes 
22 Other company B Project Manager / CSR 
Group 
27/10/09 1h15 No 
      
 CSR Managers within Business Units     
      
23 Insurance Company C / Purchase Dpt. Project Manager (2) 13/08/07 2h30 Yes 
24 Insurance Company C / Purchase Dpt. Project Manager  20/02/08 2h15 Yes 
25 Utility B / Purchase Dpt. Project Manager 28/02/08 1h02 Yes 
      
 Brokers with SRI Departments 
  
26 Broker A  Head of SRI Research 21/11/07 1h13 Yes 
27 Broker B  Head of SRI Research 23/02/09 1h05 No 
28 Broker B Head of SRI Research & SRI 
Analyst 
30/11/09 2h00 No 
  
 SRI Trade Unions” label 
  
29 CIES Trade Union A  Member  08/08/07 0h55 Yes 
30 CIES Trade Union B  Member  16/07/07 2h06 Yes 
31 CIES Trade Union A, B & C Members (3) 11/01/10 2h00 No 
  
 Consultants specialized in CSR/SRI  
  
32 Consulting Firm A  Senior Consultant  09/07/07 1h30 No 
33 Consulting Firm B  Partner  05/03/08 1h00 Yes 
34 Consulting Firm C  Senior Consultant 07/11/07 1h30 No 
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 Organization Function Date Time Recorded 
35 Consulting Firm D  Consultant 25/02/08 1h00 No 
  
 French Asset Management Professional Association 
  
36 French Association of Management  Head of Research 22/10/07 2h15 No 
37 French Association of Management  Chief Executive Officer 23/07/07 1h35 Yes 
  
 NGO 
  
38 NGO A specialized in SRI  Head of SRI Research 30/10/08 0h50 Yes 
39 NGO B specialized in Finance  Project Manager 06/03/08 2h03 Yes 
  
 Pension Funds 
  
40 Pension Fund A  Head of Equity and SRI 29/10/08 1h07 Yes 
  
 Social Rating Agencies 
  
41 Social Rating Agency A  Head of Research 12/12/07 1h22 Yes 
42 Social Rating Agency B  Head of Research 19/09/08 1h00 Yes 
43 Social Rating Agency C  Head of Research 02/08/07 0h45 Yes 
44 Social Rating Agency D  Head of Research 09/08/07 1h05 Yes 
45 Social Rating Agency E  Senior Client Relationship 
Manager 
26/09/08 1h52 Yes 
  
 Others 
  
46 Think Tank B specialized in SRI  Project Manager 17/07/07 1h29 Yes 
47 Development French Agency Consultant for the 
Headquarters 
25/02/09 1h05 Yes 
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Table 1. Ideal Type of Financial Logic in the Asset Management Industry  
(Adapted from Laurel, 2013 based on Thornton, 2002; Thornton et al., 2012) 
 
 Financial Logic 
Economic System - Market Capitalism 
Mission  - Clear mission of profit maximization by optimizing risk and return 
- Guided by strong economic theories such as portfolio theory and 
yield curve 
Sources of Identity - Asset Management as profit-maximizing business 
Basis of Norms - Self-interest 
Basis of Attention  - Status gained from profit maximization 
Basis of Strategy - Increase financial profit 
Sources of Legitimacy - Net Asset Value and financial return over a benchmark 
Sources of Authority & 
Authority Structures 
- Shareholder (client) activism 
- Fiduciary duty 
Governance  - Highly regulated 
- Strong governance structures in place (e.g. Management fees; 
reporting and disclosure standards) 
Tools and Models - Sophisticated tools and models 
- Reporting and disclosure standards 
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Figure 1: SRI Invest’s Organizational Chart 
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Figure 2: Decision Matrix (source: SRI Invest) 
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Figure 3: Equity Investment Process (source: SRI Invest) 
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Figure 4: Fixed-Income Funds’ SRI Constraint (source: SRI Invest) 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Example of yield curve13 
 
                                                          
13 The yield curve exhibits the relationship between interest rates and time. Used as a benchmark for debt in the 
market, the shape of the yield curve gives an idea of the future interest rate direction.  
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Figure 6 : Example of corporates’ SRI ranking  used in both equity and fixed-income investment (source : SRI Invest) 
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Figure 7 – Example of company fact sheets used in both equity and fixed-income investment (source : SRI Invest)14 
 
                                                          
14 The analyst’s name is a pseudonym. 
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Figure 8 : The mediating role of instruments in the transformation of a logic and its associated 
practices 
 
 
 
